This week we ask: How should politicians’ behaviour be regulated? How, that is, can we best ensure that politicians are honest, play fair, and do a decent job?
Questions about politicians’ behaviour have been high on the political agenda here in the UK in recent months and years.
Boris Johnson’s premiership was dogged – and ultimately ended – by allegations that he was serially dishonest and tolerated bullying and other misconduct from his inner circle. Liz Truss sidelined independent sources of expertise and presided over catastrophic policy failure. And Rishi Sunak – though he entered Downing Street promising integrity, professionalism, and accountability – appointed a Home Secretary who only six days previously had left government for breaching the Ministerial Code, installed two other ministers against whom there are allegations of bullying, and (at the time of recording) yet to appoint an Ethics Adviser.
So how can we ensure high standards of behaviour from our politicians? Can we rely simply on political accountability, and the disciplining role of the ballot box? Or do advisers, regulators, and perhaps even judges need also to play a role?
This week our host Professor Alan Renwick is joined by two real experts:
Professor Robert Hazell, who founded the UCL Constitution Unit in 1995 and remained its Director until 2015.
Sir Peter Riddell, Honorary Professor in the UCL Department of Political Science, ex- Political Editor of the Financial Times and Chief Political Commentator at the Times, Director and Chief Executive of the Institute for Government between 2012 and 2016, and Commissioner for Public Appointments from 2016 until 2021.
Related reading:
SUMMARY KEYWORDS
regulators, appointments, standards, robert, mps, government, accountability, parliament, prime minister, committee, peter, behaviour, politicians, public, statutory basis, executive, commissioner, ministers, judicial appointments, independent
SPEAKERS
Alan Renwick, Peter Riddell, Robert Hazell
Alan Renwick 00:05
Hello this is UCL Uncovering Politics. This week we ask how should politicians behaviour be regulated? How that is can we best ensure that politicians are honest, play fair, and do a decent job?
Hello, my name is Alan Renwick and welcome to UCL Uncovering Politics, the podcast of the School of Public Policy, and Department of Political Science at University College London. Questions about politicians behaviour have been high on the political agenda here in the UK in recent months and years. Boris Johnson's premiership was dogged and ultimately ended by allegations that he was serially dishonest and tolerated bullying and other misconduct from his inner circle. Liz Truss sidelined independent sources of expertise and presided over a catastrophic policy failure. And Rishi Sunak, though he entered Downing Street promising integrity, professionalism, and accountability, appointed a Home Secretary, who only six days previously had left government for breaching the ministerial code, installed two other ministers against whom there are allegations of bullying, and is yet at least at the time of recording, to appoint an ethics adviser.
So how can we ensure high standards of behaviour from our politicians? Can we rely simply on political accountability and the disciplining role of the ballot box? Or do advisors, regulators, and perhaps even judges need to play a role as well? Well, here to chew over such questions. I'm delighted to be joined by two real experts. Robert Hazell is Professor of Government and the Constitution here in the UCL Department of Political Science. He founded the UCL Constitution Unit in 1995, and remained its Director until 2015. And over the summer, he coauthored a constitution unit report on constitutional watchdogs. And Sir Peter Riddell is Honorary Professor in the UCL Department of Political Science. He had a distinguished career as a journalist lasting for decades, serving as Political Editor of the Financial Times, and Chief Political Commentator at the Times, he was Director and Chief Executive of the Institute for Government between 2012 and 2016. And among a range of public service roles in recent years, he was Commissioner for Public Appointments from 2016 until 2021.
Welcome, Robert and Peter both to UCL Uncovering Politics. And we'll get on to the question of how to ensure good behaviour in a moment. But could we start by considering why we should care about politicians behaviour and standards of behaviour in the first place? Robert, do standards of politicians behaviour really matter? And if so, why?
Robert Hazell 03:00
Absolutely, they matter. For a fundamental reason. If we are to go on having trust in our politicians and our political system, we must be able to rely on them, to be honest, and to tell the truth. Those are two really important fundamentals. And just to give recent examples, during the COVID crisis, there were a series of allegations of possible conflicts of interest in the letting of very big government contracts, for protective equipment, and the like. And if there were conflicts of interest, and if ministers and all their advisors were acting in ways that were dishonest, then that is both corrupting of public trust and it's also erodes confidence in good management of the public finances.
In terms of telling the truth. That's a very live issue, because the former Prime Minister Boris Johnson is currently the subject of an investigation by the parliamentary Privileges Committee on whether he misled Parliament. That may sound rather abstruse and esoteric, but it is fundamentally important that parliamentarians and we the public can rely on ministers when they're giving answers in Parliament to tell the truth. Ministers are, if you like, the drivers of the bus of the government machine, the rest of us are passengers. We have to be able to rely on the driver of the bus to tell the truth about where the bus is going, how long it would take, and in particular, if anything is going wrong, to tell us what the risks are. And because of that huge gap in information between government ministers and backbench MPs and the wider public, we have to rely on government to tell the truth when they are answering questions in Parliament.
Alan Renwick 05:10
Peter, do you want to add to that?
Peter Riddell 05:11
Not really. Only a kind of historical point. That in a sense the public, in the wider sense, have never really trusted politicians. Remember there's a line and national anthem about their their navies tricks, and you can read plenty in Shakespeare about scepticism about politicians. So there's a long standing and the battles are over the holding politicians to account for truthfulness, also for not being corrupt. I mean, that was one of the big battle of the 18th and early 19th century against the old corruption.
So some of the battles are very long standing. I think it's changed historically with a less differential society. You know obviously, the mass franchise. Also over the course of last 50 years. And indeed in my career as a journalist, which you referred to Alan, it was very much a closed. When I first became a political journalist 41 years ago, it was a it was a kind of closed world. Now that's completely ended, with some downsides, as well as generally strong upsides. So the public has been more demanding, and equally more suspicious. And one of the paradoxes which we could address is that the the arrival of various standards watchdogs hasn't increased trust in politicians, even though in many cases, perhaps not in the last few years. But over the course of the last 25 years, standards have improved in many areas, but the public don't believe it. Because that is one of the paradoxes. If you have regulators, if you look at it, and people think, well, there must be something wrong. And it doesn't necessary reassure. And that's one of the actually, I regard not as an argument against regulation, but doing it in a transparent and open manner.
Alan Renwick 06:51
And what you've just said, there, I think will surprise many people, Peter, you've just suggested that standards have improved. And I think when people look at standards under Boris Johnson, in particular, perhaps Liz Truss as well, then they would be very sceptical of the suggestion that standards during this period are higher than they were under Margaret Thatcher under John Major under Tony Blair.
Peter Riddell 07:15
Now, there are problems I wouldn't deny some of them have got worse during the period when I was Commissioner, under the Johnson and later administrations, I wouldn't deny that at all. But that only applied to a small number of appointments. For many, the system is more transparent and fairer now than it was, say 30 years ago. So one shouldn't exaggerate. I mean, I think the problems are very serious. I mean, some of the ones Robert and I would totally agree on, which happened under Johnson, are very serious indeed. You shouldn't confuse that with the system as a whole. I think in many respects, standards because there's greater transparency, are clearer. Certainly, say in public appointments, [???] like that, for a very high percentage of appointments is a fair if not, if imperfect system.
07:15
Well, two things. One, I did actually put in perhaps an understated clause, saying perhaps not the last few years. And secondly, look at across the. We tend naturally to focus on central government, Prime Minister, and things like that. But if you look across the wide range, for example, local government, Robert, quite rightly referred to some of the really concerning things about the award of contracts during COVID. But in general, the award of contracts, both centrally and locally, we've got a cleaner system than many countries. There's a there's an extensive audit system, even in my old area public appointments, if you go pre, the mid 1990s, when I was called pre Nolan and the establishment committee on standards in public life, it was an entirely a patronage system.
Alan Renwick 08:49
Robert, you've also been around British politics for quite a few years. How would you characterise the patterns of change over time in standards?
Robert Hazell 08:59
I agree with with Peter. I think standards have gradually improved with a tightening up of the system. Particularly in the example Peter gave over public appointments which are no longer nakedly pure patronage and tap on the shoulder. I can give the other example in appointments of judicial appointments, which used to be purely the choice of the individual Lord Chancellor and again, a tap on the shoulder. Now regulated by the Judicial Appointments Commission, And it's a very much more merit based appointments process. Even in appointments to the House of Lords. We do now have a commission, the House of Lords Appointments Commission, which seeks to regulate that aspect of prime ministerial patronage, although as we may come onto, it is at the moment a rather weak body which badly needs strengthening.
Alan Renwick 09:56
And so that's appointments, so if we think about honesty. Is it true? Do you think that politicians are more willing to lie today than in past decades?
Robert Hazell 10:10
I mean, that varies depending on on the individual and the administration. I think, certainly under Johnson standards have slipped, compared to say with a Prime Minister like Thatcher, who was a former barrister, she greatly respected the rule of law. She had a lot of respect in particular for her Lord Chancellor, Lord Mackay. And I think standards slipped, we shouldn't focus solely on Johnson. They started to slip badly under Cameron. Cameron, both when Prime Minister and also as an ex-Prime Minister, I find it hard to think of any other post-war Prime Minister, who might have lobbied government in the shameless way that Cameron did, on behalf of Greensill the financial services company that that subsequently went bust. So if there has been a slide in the last 10 years or so, I would say it started with Cameron.
Peter Riddell 11:18
One's got to bear in mind, one of the biggest lies in politics was goes back a very long time 66 years to the Suez Crisis, when the Prime Minister absolutely deceived the British public and Parliament over the reasons for the invasion. And I mean it brought him down, well the failure of the Suez enterprise brought him down. But people have lied before. I think the change, one of the changes is there is much more public exposure. It is much less a closed world, it's harder for politicians to keep things because one, there are a lot of gossipy people around, the rise of social advisors, and so on, has made a much more exposed world for social media. I mean, the world of when there were daily newspapers and rather constrained BBC and ITV News has gone, totally gone. And now it's what's next on Twitter. And that can expose very quickly, someone being dishonest and so on.
And I certainly, I think the question is, how much are we under all kinds of extreme political pressures being through a rogue phase over the last few years? Or is it something which needs correcting. The assumptions of self regulation, which applied in the past or minimal or weak regulation? As Robert rightly points out, in terms of the House of Lords Appointments Commission, do they need strengthening? Because we've had rogue Prime Ministers and I agree with Robert, some of the problems are in the lobbying one on Greensill by David Cameron I find completely inexplicable. It's also extremely stupid too. But the extent to which you therefore need to change the framework, or as you just say we've just gone through a bad patch. I mean, there's a parallel interesting parallel with the House of Commons, where speaker Bercow, was offered a speaker only up to three years ago, pushed the limits a lot and appeared to slide and was regarded as partisan by particularly the Brexiteers. But was that just a extreme speaker in extreme circumstances? You can argue that the system is correct itself is setup, that is not necessarily a satisfactory argument on aspects of the executive.
Alan Renwick 13:35
And you take us on there directly to the next question, which is how should standards be upheld? So I think we've, we've discussed that standards clearly matter. We've discussed that there is a problem in the UK, there's an interesting story about the trajectory of that problem over time. But it's clear that there is a problem, and we would like things to be better.
So the next question, Peter is, well, how can we uphold the standards? You've you've pointed there towards one mechanism, which is self regulation, and perhaps that will come back and be stronger over the coming period. But there's also of course, the force of politics, political accountability, and there are all these various regulations and so on that both of you have have already mentioned, how should we be doing this?
Peter Riddell 14:25
Well, I think the political accountability that gets to the nub to my mind of the argument. I'm very struck in the recent debate in the House of Lords on law, not the last bill to strengthen the House of Lords appointment process, which received the support of 25 out of 27 speakers in the debate. And it was very good debate. The the government's defence or the limited government defence didn't convince most conservative peers let alone others, was that Prime Minister is accountable for his nominations. Accountable to Parliament and accountable the electorate. That was basically laughed out by peers, including some ex MPs who said, they've been saying elections they never ever heard nominations to the House of Lords raised on the doorstep. Why should they? When it's cost of living, health service and so on.
And equally accountability to the House of Commons is very, very weak, for a lot of nominations. So I think the, that's why using that as an argument, which was used almost in a quasi presidential way, you know, we elect, we have a general election, the Prime Minister's there. That was one of the defences of Boris Johnson that he had a mandate from that. And that was accountability. I don't think that's satisfactory. I think that if, as we've seen the last few years, the previous conventions are broken down. It's not purely a system of self regulation, because that's where the constitutional watchdogs have come in. All of them have been created in relation to crises or perceptions of scandal. If you go through the last 30 years, you can you can tick them off in relation to when there was a scandal, and when there was a row and so on. The argument now is are they strong enough?
And I'm very suspicious of the argument that you should entrust the executive with all power. The question is the balance. And I think the really difficult issue, and it's one where you could argue it goes back to Charles the First. Many things do. The the just to say that an elected government can do what it wants almost, which is implicit in some of the defences of government action, is not satisfactory. Certainly the ultimate decisions. I mean, for example, give the example that Robert gave, of the Judicial Appointments Commission, which is the strongest form of regulation, in constitutional terms we've got, where one name or series of names are put up, and the Lord Chancellor can accept or reject. And that's, that's the tightest in my old area of public appointment. It's a range of names, which a judged appointable. So you could argue that yes, ministers should have the final say. How constrained should their say be? And that's where the debate is. And I think, where the government is resisting, in a number of areas, any incursion in on what might describe as executive privilege.
Alan Renwick 17:06
And, Robert, do we find different patterns in relation to kind of different standards I guess? So Peter is talking there about appointments and making the point already that there are differences between judicial appointments and some other appointments. If we go to wider ethical standards around honesty, for example, presumably there's there's greater a greater role for the political process there and a lesser a role for accountability. So sorry, there's a greater role for the political process there and a lesser role for regulators. How should we understand what the balance between these different factors should be?
Robert Hazell 17:44
Well, I think Peter put it very well, in saying that, with all these different regulators, the trick is to find the right balance, and it does vary. Let me give you one example, in relation to the regulation of the conduct of MPs, which has had a regulator now for almost 30 years, called the Parliamentary Commissioner for standards, an office originally proposed in a very early report from the Committee on Standards in Public Life. And I think we're now about to come on to our 7th holder of that office.
But when it began, it was a fairly weak office. And memorably the second holder of that office, Liz Filkin, was not reappointed, because in trying to regulate MPs, conduct and behaviour, she irked enough MPs that they wanted to see the back of her. As a result, more recently, the holders of that office have been appointed for a single non-renewable term, so that MPs no longer have the power to say we don't like this irksom regulation away with the regulator. The Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards comes under a House of Commons select committee now called the Standards Committee. And just in recent years, in the last 10 years or so, in order to ensure that it isn't simply a system of self regulation, where the risk is obvious that MPs could be a little lenient towards one of their own. There have been introduced independent members, non MPs onto that committee, starting I think about 10 years ago with just three of them.
There are no seven independent members on the standards committee and seven MPs. And when doing our project for a report called Parliament's Watchdogs, if I may let me trail that, a recent publication by the Constitution Unit on our website. I interviewed the Chair of the Standards Committee, Chris Bryant, and he said, it's really interesting now that there are seven independent members in effect, they are the dominant voice on the committee. Because as the Chair, I only have a casting vote. And so in effect, the independent members cannot vote the MPs seven to six. And so that's a history of how, in one regulator, the balance has gradually evolved towards strengthening the independent element in the committee that supervises the regulator, and as a result, I would argue, has also greatly bolstered the independence of the regulator himself. It is about to be a man, the last two regulators have been women. And the regulator I've been talking about is the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards.
Alan Renwick 20:48
And you're clearly implying that independence is a key feature of an effective regulator.
Robert Hazell 20:55
Absolutely. And this is the tension with all the regulators between the need for a very high degree of independence, but they must also be accountable. In particular, they must be accountable to politicians, and to the political process. If politicians are to have confidence in the regulator, who is regulating their conduct and their behaviour. Peter?
Peter Riddell 21:22
I would draw a distinction, and it's an important one, between the parliamentary regulators, and those concerned with the executive. Because I think there is, it has been I wouldn't say easy, that's the wrong way to put it. It's been possible to do create the independent element, which Robert so clearly describes, in Parliament after lots of struggles and so on.
But with the executive, the executive is always determined to retain the ultimate control. Ultimate control in two ways, the nominating the regulators, that there may be an independent panel, but ultimately, the choice of regulators is made by the executive. And secondly, defining the terms on which they operate. That if I put an example, I was in an open process, six and a half years ago, but the decision to appoint me was taken by David Cameron in his last years and in fact Matt Hancock.
Alan Renwick 22:21
That was the decision to appoint you as Commissioner for Public Appointments.
Peter Riddell 22:26
And, you know, I did have a pre-appointment hearing and a demanding one, and so on. That was fine. I actually would favour much stronger parliamentary involvement, but we can come on to. But ultimately that and also the code in which I operated. Whilst I managed to modify it and change some of the proposals was ultimately the executives code. Ministry, I wasn't opposed to that, because it did make it clear the terms on which I was operating, there wasn't an ambiguity, because there had been previously.
But that is an example. And it's echoed in other areas. I mean, a classic is the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, which does deals with the jobs which ex-ministers and ex-senior civil servants can take on. And as its current chairman, Lord Pickles, himself a former Tory cabinet minister, but a neutral independent one has complained they really do have no sanctions at all over the what they can do. They can write a complaining letter and publish it, they can't constrain anything. And that that an executive is just reluctant to take tougher action. And its got to bear that in mind that the both the appointees and the the framework in which they operate are very much determined by the executive. And it's as Robert said it's a balance, but it's a balance, which, to my mind, is needs strengthening on the accountability and transparency side.
Alan Renwick 23:49
And I mean, I guess one way of removing executive control over these measures would be to put the framework of these regulators into law. Such that the regulator, the executive can't just decide what, how it wants things to work at any given point in time. Peter, in your view, would that be a good idea to set down the parameters of the regulators in law?
Peter Riddell 24:12
I would indeed, I think the word parameters, Alan, is a very good one. Obviously, you've got to be discretion, and there is a balance in practice, but I could have been abolished with an ordering Council, which would have been a bit huffing and puffing, but that would have been true. Some bodies are even weaker, they're completely advisory. And the Prime Minister could wake up this morning and say, I don't want X or Y body. I think the statutory thing is interesting. There are two statutory significant statutory bodies one Robert has mentinioned, which is Judicial Appointments Commission. The other is a Civil Service Commission, which is very long standing, but was made statutory in the dying days of the 2005-2010 government.
Largely thanks, then Cabinet Secretary Gus O'Donnell, who ensured the a modified version of a then bill got through, we put it on a statutory basis. And having talked to various also as commissioners I've worked along in parallel with them for five years. Their view was that it didn't make much difference day to day. But it was very valuable in case of crisis and a reinforcement. They're always able to cite the statutory basis to prevent ministers doing things on a whim. And it didn't happen very often, perhaps once or twice in a five year term as commissioner, but it was there. And I think that is very important that you look back in the last 10 years, and a couple of times when the successive civil service commissioners have referred to their statutory powers. So yes, I think it would be very valuable, valuable, both to define the terms of appointment, and also the terms of accountability. Those are the parameters I would stress.
Alan Renwick 25:49
And how would you persuade ministers to do that? Because obviously, they're quite reluctant to give up discretion.
Peter Riddell 25:56
With considerable difficulty. The only the only time is really, if there's a change of power. I mean, if you look, if I may draw a kind of, not too lose a parallel, there was a long debate on the powers of select committees in the late 1970s. There was a very good Select Committee, which looked into processes. And the Conservatives in opposition committed themselves to change. It's very unlikely that that change would have occurred any later than a year or two, into the life of the 1979 Parliament.
It happened quickly. The [???] committees were established. And there they were. I don't think it would have happened later in the process at all. And I think you've got to quickly, I think it's highly unlikely that an existing government, which will always see the objections, will always be defending ministerial prerogatives. Only under the pressure of crises do changes happen. I mean, it was interesting in the case of the expensive scandal, I'm going back to 2009, when a committee under Tony Wright was set up, why cross party support on it, that produced some extremely good proposals, and but it was only under that pressure and then brought in by the Conservative government in 2010.
Alan Renwick 27:19
And Robert, and do feel free to respond to that. But also, I guess, Peter has put into our minds there the thoughts of what an incoming Labour government might do in this area. And and the one thing that Labour has very clearly said already, is that they want to consolidate all of the various or at least some of the various regulators. And we have been talking about it as a confusing array of regulators here. So they've proposed consolidating those into one regulator. Is that also a reform, Robert, that you think would be desirable? Or would there be problems with that?
Robert Hazell 27:55
This is a proposal that's been made by Angela Rayner, as deputy leader of the Labour Party. I think it's an excessively ambitious proposal. And I don't think it's necessary. Yes, as we've been discussing, several of the regulators are weak, and some of them are very weak. But in my mind, the solution is to strengthen them, and not to engage in a more wholesale reorganisation, which would take a lot longer in terms of its planning and implementation, and it would encounter a lot of resistance, not least, from some of the individual regulators, whose offices would be abolished.
But if I could come back briefly, to the need to put some of these regulators on a statutory basis, we should mention the private member's bill recently introduced into the House of Lords by David Anderson, Lord Anderson, which would put on a statutory basis, the independent adviser on ministers interests, the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, and I think Peter's old office, the Commissioner for Public Appointments. And it will be an interesting test of the government's willingness to contemplate such reforms. To see what the government is response when the second reading debate happens on that bill, we shouldn't hold our breath. If their attitude is the same as Peter has just described to Lord Norton's bill to strengthen the House of Lords Appointments Commission, it seems highly unlikely that they will welcome this. But there will be a parliamentary debate about it.
Alan Renwick 29:42
We're coming to the end of our time. So could I just ask each of you to sum up very, very quickly, you may already have said this, essentially. But what would be your top priority for the actions that need to be taken in order to improve our system for upholding standards? Peter, you want to go first?
Peter Riddell 29:59
Well, actually, Robert has give me the cue there. I think the David Anderson bill to put on a statutory basis, various regulators is a good preliminary step. I think that I also think that with putting the House of Lords Appointment Commission. Lord Norton's bill, which will clearly not become law because the government's hostility to it, that output is another aspect to it, to raise the profile of the issue on it.
The one thing I would say is, I think that the regulator's themselves and I did that a bit as well, when I was Appointments Commissioner can do quite a lot districts and accountability to Parliament. I went probably beyond my remit in fostering relations with select committees over controversial appointments. I'd write to the chairs of that committee. And I think that the traditional attitude in Whitehall is of suspicion of select committees. I regarded them as allies, both the public Public Administration Committee, which was the kind of generic one I was accountable to, and specific departmental committees over particular appointments. And I think that the regulators should regard select committees as allies, not as people wanting to trip them up. And I think that is something which happens without law can happen now, and actually can alter it and move the debate on.
And one final thing is that there's a trick. There's a precedent, for example, in appointments, the appointment is announced, the preferred candidate in the in the language goes before a select committee, if it's a free appointment, everyone knows how important it. But however, the Secretary of State who's nominating the person doesn't. And I would actually make Secretary of State much more accountable for their actions, instead of kind of slightly woody talk on the floor of the house, if you've got them precisely saying, I am nominating this person to do this, or I've done that. That form of accountability would have substance, as opposed to a general one of being accountable to the electorate or MPs in general. So those are my kind of immediate suggestions taking forward, which can be done. I think they don't substantially alter the balance, but they would improve the balance and improve accountability and transparency.
Alan Renwick 32:12
And, Robert?
Robert Hazell 32:14
I would address I think two more things. In addition to the fundamental suggestion, we've both been saying that the regulator's who don't currently have a statutory basis should be given a statutory footing.
And my two further thoughts would be, I think it's really important to set a strong lead from the top. And I, I would love to see Rishi Sunak as the new prime minister, give a major public [???] or statement, following through on his promise that his government will be one of integrity, professionalism, and accountability, to signal a really definite and strong change of tone. And I would wish the same of Kier Starmer if he wins the next election, and he becomes the next Prime Minister, he needs to signal a major change of tone with a major public statement.
My final suggestion, a more modest one, is that I would love to see the Committee on Standards in Public Life, playing a rather stronger role as a spokesman for the other constitutional regulators defending them when they come under attack. And actually, they have started to do that, in particular, its chair, Jonathan Evans, Lord Evans, notably did that when Conservative MPs tried to undermine the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards during the Owen Paterson affair. I think we don't sufficiently regulate, recognise, that being a regulator can be a lonely task. It's a pretty thankless task. And these individual regulators badly need a support group to explain when they come under attack, that they're only doing their job. And they need defending by people other than themselves. And that's a role I would like to see the Committee on Standards in Public Life playing a bit more strongly.
Alan Renwick 34:18
Well, thank you so much, Robert and Peter, you've both given some very clear messages there. So let's hope that at least some of the key people are listening to what you're saying.
And if you'd like to read more on the themes that we've been discussing, Robert and Peter both contribute regularly to the Constitution Unit blog. We also mentioned a report called 'Parliament's Watchdogs: Independence and Accountability of Five Constitutional Regulators'. That's by Robert Hazel with Marcial Boo and Zachariah Puller, and it was published in July. It's available on the Constitution Unit website.
Next week, we'll be looking at a new book by our colleague here in the UCR Department of Political Science, Dr. Kate Cronin Furman. It's called 'Hypocrisy and Human Rights: Resisting Accountability for Mass Atrocities'. And it examines how repressive states have responded to calls for justice in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and elsewhere.
Remember to make sure you don't miss out on that or other future episodes of UCL Uncovering Politics all you need to do is subscribe. You can do so on Apple, Google Podcasts or whatever podcast provider you use.
I'm Alan Renwick. This episode was produced by Conor Kelly and Eleanor Kingwell-Banham, our theme music is written and performed by John Mann. This has been UCL Uncovering Politics. Thank you for listening