UCL Uncovering Politics

French Social Democracy In Turmoil

Episode Summary

This week we’re examining the state of social democracy in France. Why has it failed so badly in recent years? And what are its prospects for revival?

Episode Notes

In a turbulent political summer, few surprises were greater than that caused by French president Emmanuel Macron’s decision in June to call early parliamentary elections. Macron’s party had just been trounced in the European Parliament elections; and victory for the far right seemed likely. In the end, thanks to some last minute deals, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally did not win. Rather, it was an alliance of the left that secured most seats in the National Assembly. 

France’s Socialist Party was regularly in power from the early 1980s till the mid 2010s. But it collapsed spectacularly in the elections of 2017, and its very survival today seems in doubt. So what has been going on? And have the recent elections brought any signs of revival?

Joining us to explore these questions is Philippe Marlière, Professor of French and European Politics in the UCL European and International Social and Political Studies department.

This episode of UCL Uncovering Politics is the first in an occasional series of episodes based on pieces in Political Quarterly.


Mentioned in this episode:

Episode Transcription

Alan Renwick: [00:00:00] Hello, this is UCL Uncovering Politics, and this week we're examining the state of social democracy in France. Why has it failed so badly in recent years, and what are its prospects for revival? Hello, my name is Alan Renwick, and welcome to UCL Uncovering Politics, the podcast of the School of Public Policy and Department of Political Science at University College London. 

In a turbulent political summer, few surprises were greater than that caused by French President Emmanuel Macron's decision in June to call early parliamentary elections. Macron's party had just been trounced in the European Parliament elections, and victory for the far right seemed likely.

In the end, thanks to some last minute deals, Marine Le Pen's national rally did not win, rather it was an alliance of the left that secured most seats in the [00:01:00] National Assembly. But no bloc secured a majority, and gridlock ensued over who would form a government, gridlock that was resolved only in September with the appointment as Prime Minister of centre right veteran Michel Barnier.

Well, with all that going on, we thought now was a good time to explore the state of French politics. Rather to try to cover everything, although podcasts are available for that, We thought we would do what academics do best and give you a deep dive into one part of the overall story. That part is the state of social democracy.

France's Socialist party was regularly in power from the early 1980s to the mid 2010s, but it collapsed spectacularly in the elections of 2017, and its very survival seemed in doubt.

Alan Renwick: So what's been going on, and have the recent elections brought any signs of revival? I'm delighted to say that joining us to explore these questions today is Philippe Marliere, Professor of French and European Politics in the [00:02:00] UCL European and International Social and Political Studies Department.

Philippe, welcome to UCL Uncovering Politics. It's really great to have you today. And just before we begin, I should say that our conversation is going to be building off an article that you've recently written on French social democracy in the journal Political Quarterly. And this episode of UCL Uncovering Politics is actually the first in an occasional series of episodes that we're going to be doing together based on recent pieces in Political Quarterly. If listeners don't know it, PQ is a great journal that, much like this podcast, seeks to make cutting edge research about politics accessible to a wide audience beyond academia. And we're really looking forward to collaborating with them in the coming months.

So Philippe, let's get into the story of French social democracy. And I guess many listeners will be unfamiliar with the shape of the traditional French Party system and how that's evolved over time so do you want to [00:03:00] maybe fill us in with a little bit of background before we focus in on the Socialist party?

Philippe Marliere: Absolutely. 

Thank you. 

First of all for inviting me Alan. Well until I should say the election of Emmanuel Macron in 2017, the French party system was remarkably stable. Of course, you had different blocks, a left and the right and within the left and within the right block different parties, some winning election with an absolute majority.

And all that came to an end progressively to be fair, because, in fact, from the 1990s onward, there was a newcomer into the political scene in the French party system, i. e. on the far right, with a then National Front, renamed in 2018 National Rally, Marine Le Pen's party. And of course, that brought progressive change to the party system, but I think in a nutshell until I should say 10 15 years ago. You you had two blocks [00:04:00] left and the right lets also remember that the French invented the notions of left and right following the French Revolution 1789 very handy notions and French people relate very much those notions of left and right. 

Within the left you had basically two parties Socialist communist on the left and a kind of center- right Pro European Liberal minded party and also economically liberal on the center right.

That was for instance the the sort of the bloc run by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, once president of France in the 1970s. 

But of course, the story started changing because of the party on the far right, going from strength to strength, getting more and more votes not winning elections yet, but becoming progressively no longer kind of fringe party, 

And all that came to an end at this 2017 election where for the, for the first time an [00:05:00] incumbent president, François Hollande, a Socialist, decided not to run for re- election. I think that was the first time in the Fifth Republic. Fifth Republic is the name given to the current constitution of France.

It's a constitution which gives tremendous power to the president, as opposed to the, to the parliament, and even as opposed to the, to the government.

So. Macron decided to run and he did it in a way which was of course very original, very new in the French party system, which was an attempt to combine, to rally bits of the left and bits of the right, the center left, the center right, that is. Something quite unique, because in France there are two blocks, left and right, as I say, and it seems absolutely virtually impossible to escape that reality, that's hard reality, but he tried to overcome this.

And I should say that for a while, he was quite successful at it, because if you look at his first election, his party received an [00:06:00] absolute majority in the house, so was able to carry on with this sort of, um, the tale of the fifth republic where, where the president's party wins in a subsequent general election an absolute majority and is able to govern.

Alan Renwick: So these are, this is in the elections of 2017. 

Philippe Marliere: 2017. 

So then he had an absolute majority, so really free rein he could really actually implement all kinds of the policies he wanted to, but he did so by turning to the center left and central right, some even coming from the post Gaullist party, so further to the right.

That was quite unique. The second thing which was also unique about Macron is that he was virtually unknown to the French people and French voters until he's run. And he managed out of the blue to create a new party. And also, that was also another, another dent into the, the sort of stability of the French market system where normally it's the old parties, the very well known as we have in Britain, by [00:07:00] the way, you know, always the same party well established, well rooted locally, which can make a difference.

Here, a brand new party. If you look at the intake. In terms of MPs in the parliament in 2017, I think a very large majority of Macron's MPs had no prior political background. They were all newcomers to politics.

Of course, that came to an end in 2022 with a first warning because 2022, Macron got reelected against Marine Le Pen for the second time. And, he failed to get an absolute majority. 

I should point out that in France, these are two different elections. The French vote first for the president. And then there's another vote for MPs and the winning party of that election, like in the UK, of course, is able, to form the government and, and a prime minister is appointed.

So first warning, didn't get an absent majority. And in a way that leads to the current situation, it's because you didn't have an absolute [00:08:00] majority and was finding it very hard to pass legislation that on the back of a very poor result at the EU election. National Rally won it emphatically, distancing by 10 points the Macron's party.

So on the back 

Alan Renwick: So National Rally, we should say, is the far right party? 

Philippe Marliere: Is the far right party, Le Pen's party, yes. 

So, Macron went on TV and made a, made a dramatic announcement saying, well, I dissolve this National Assembly, and the French people will vote again, two years after electing the Chambre, there will be a new vote. So it's a snap election. And we all know the results. This time around instead of sending back an absolute majority to Macron the situation worsened for him and I should say for everyone because we are currently in a political conundrum.

They are now three blocs and possibly four, none of them has an absolute majority and coalition are [00:09:00] proving extremely difficult to make. So this is where we are now. 

Alan Renwick: Fantastic. That's a great overview. And I'm very keen to get into the current situation and just what we should make of it later on.

Let's go back right to the start of that, that story. And I'm really interested in what you were. describing there in terms of the, the two blocks, the left and right blocks, but each of those consisting of two main political parties. And on the left, given that we're focusing on the left here today the two parties, the Socialist party and the communist party.

And how would you characterize those two parties and the basis of those two parties in French society during the, the early decades of the fifth Republic? 

Philippe Marliere: Well, the basis of these two parties is a historic split in 1920. And of course, it's a split that not simply concerns the French Socialists of that period, but I think all Socialists across the world were faced with the same issue.

Following the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, there was the so called 21 [00:10:00] Zinoviev conditions put forward by the new Bolshevik regime to all social democracy parties across the world saying, well, second international, i. e. the social democratic international has failed because it didn't prevent the first world war.

We need a new international, a communist one. So join us and create around the world in Europe to start with new communist parties which will be the true instrument of the working class to leading to the revolution. That was the starting point. And there was there were debates everywhere, including in the UK, except in the UK, the communist motion was in the minority, but in France, it was a big split.

And which led to, in fact, the majority of MPs of the Socialist party was called SFIO at the time, left the party and created a new, the new party communist party. So, If you want to understand the origins of that schism between [00:11:00] why are there two parties, and let's bear in mind that the communist party in France was the dominant party on the left until the 1970s.

Alan Renwick: And now you're right in thinking the Communist Party had the support of most of the trade unions. So it was, it kind of retained a lot of the working class base during that time.

Philippe Marliere: Yes, it had the support of the main union, CGT and now I think the links between the two parties, in a way the Communist Party is very weak now, has very few MPs. It's it's we're talking about if we talk about the, the, the, the downfall of the Socialist Party, that's even worse for the communists.

They're in a poor state, but for a very long time, they were closely associated with the main union in France, CGT. 

Alan Renwick: So what is, what was it that brought Miran success in the 1980s?

So this was the period, I think, correct me if I'm wrong, of the greatest success for the Socialist party when Miran managed to vanquish, if you like, the Communist party on, on the left, and allow the Socialists to be the main party of the left and for a period there, the Socialist Party was [00:12:00] really quite dominant, won the presidency twice won the parliamentary elections, the National Assembly elections several times as well.

What was it that brought that success for the Socialist Party during that period? 

Philippe Marliere: There was a number of factors at play. I think there are two big dates. It's 1936, the popular France, the first time the left is in power with the Léon Blum government, passing lots of Legislation.

Um, and the second big date is the Mitterrand's victory in 1981 for the first time in the Fifth Republic. The left is elected and can run France. And I think the factors are, I think you can read 1981 as a kind of delayed or postpone, um, effect of May 68. May 68 was, was strong across the world, but particularly so in France, where students rebellion was particularly strong with an alliance with workers and in the end, a very good outcome for the working class and even students in terms of [00:13:00] the conservative, the Gaullist government had to really concede quite a lot to them to restore peace.

So it was also a time of intense politicization in French society, radicalization it was a time when the left was on the ascendancy constantly. So it took probably very well experienced politician. Mitterrand was extremely experienced, well known, people could relate to, could trust, but also it took the alliance of the left. to get there. It was called then the Common Program.

The Common Program was an electoral alliance between the three main parties of the left at the time. The Radicals, they, they're called Radicals, but they're anything but radical. They're very moderate on the contrary. Then the Communists dominant on the left and the Socialists. 

And it was a bit of a political strategic masterstroke on the part of Mitterrand. Mitterrand made an alliance with the communists which were dominant then and of course some people [00:14:00] on the left on the social democracy left were absolutely appalled by that and say it's crazy you're gonna make an alliance with the communists who are stronger than us at the time of the Cold War. We disagree with them on a number of things notably foreign affairs our relationship to the USSR USSR, our Relationship to Europe Which was very important for Socialists where communists were very critical and somehow you're a skeptic.

Why did you do that? Mitterrand Was adamant. He won the leadership in 1971 of the party and in fact, it was a massive stroke because what happened is that when you have an alliance and you field candidates of the left in various constituencies, when people had the choice between a Socialist and a communist, knowing that they were into an alliance, they would prefer to vote for the more moderate of the two, i. e. the Socialist. So, in a sense, there was a kind of [00:15:00] dynamic, in favor of the Socialists, which progressively started making gains, getting more votes, getting more MPs, winning more municipalities. Municipal elections in France are very important power bases. Um, and for that reason, by 1978, so seven years after contracting that alliance with the communists, Socialists had become the main party on the left.

And that was it, because now communists very small force, very few MPs. They still have a few strongholds in some outskirts, in some working class suburbs outside of Paris. That's all. 

Alan Renwick: What was the social base of the Socialist Party during that period? 

Philippe Marliere: It was interesting because, on the one hand, was a typical catch all party able to appeal to various segments of the electorate. Not only lower middle classes. Public service workers where traditionally the Socialists are strong, teachers where [00:16:00] traditionally they were strong, but also starting immediately from the 1970s to make gains into professional liberal professions, and the working class.

This is where it was, you know, the, traditional bastions and constituencies of the Communist Party started to shift, to drift towards the Socialists. Workers, working class people shifted their vote en masse to the Socialists. And of course, over time what happened is that you had, the basis was less and less popular and became more and more middle class.

Alan Renwick: Yeah. Well, so this is exactly where I wanted to go. What, what then went wrong? We've been focusing on the history there. What, what went wrong for the Socialist Party? 

Philippe Marliere: Well, it's a party which was remarkably successful throughout the 1980s, 90s, the year 2000, and still in the 2010s by being able to win major elections if not national, like being having one of them being elected president.

So it happened three times, twice Holland, but also winning a general election in 1997 

Alan Renwick: When they didn't hold the [00:17:00] presidency, but exactly, 

Philippe Marliere: it was a cohabitation situation where you had a French president Jacques Chirac, conservative coexisting. On top of the, this jewel executive with a prime minister who was a Socialist in your national span.

So very successful. And also the success of the Socialist party was to have a power base across the country running regions. France is divided up into regions where you have regional counts. With the presidents on top with lots of power which is massively funded and they can really undertake lots of things in various policy areas.

So they were able at some point to dominate most regions. They were also running the biggest cities of France you know, so you, but progressively what happened is that being a government party, party grew less and less radical. And I think the, it started off, you know, very quickly with with from the 1980s, I think Mitterrand came to power with very radical ambitions.

[00:18:00] And within a year there were, there was a pose. There wouldn't be any break with capitalism or anything else that because those were the days where the idea was floated. There was the so called choice of Europe you know, there was strong speculation against the French, you know, got cold feet about, um, sort of, moving forward with structural reforms, lots of nationalization, for instance, it was, it was stopped and, and France became the, the sort of a perfect partner of Germany in Europe and, and starting implementing policies, which were to some extent, you know, more and more accommodating with what was very much in the air and in fashion at the time, neoliberalism.

So there's a drift in terms of economic policy. An electorate which also reflects that by being more middle class progressively. The fact when you're too long in office, even locally or on the level of the region, probably you become more of a bit of a political [00:19:00] manager than an activist. And the sort of spirit of the early days of the Socialist Party under Mitterrand, where the party was really reformist but radical at the same time, was lost.

And we get finally to the Hollande presidency where I think 

Alan Renwick: So this is 2012 to 2017. 

Philippe Marliere: Absolutely. It's worth reminding them that Hollande was elected on the back of a very right wing presidency, Nicolas Sarkozy. I think if you want to understand a lot of what is going on now, when you have a sort of coalition between Macron's party and the Republicans, if you want to understand why that block will be so easily accommodating to the the pet topics of the far right, which is immigration, Islam, and so on and so forth. I think Sarkozy was really the starting point of that, you know, by in rhetorically, but also in terms of policy implementation.

Sarkozy did already a [00:20:00] lot to, I should say, mainstream far right ideas and policies. 

And so he was electing on the back of a Sarkozy presidency. You may remember of lots of terrorist attacks on France, you know, Charlie Hebdo and all the rest.

So, um in terms of um, law and order and management of of public order Holland implemented some reforms which were not particularly pleasing for traditional left wing voters. So by the end of his mandate, five years. He was deeply unpopular, probably looking at polls and feeling that he would for sure be defeated should he run again.

He decided to not to run. In the end the Socialists were absolutely, um, emphatically defeated. They were very strongly rejected. There was even um, on the part of center left voters, a great deal of anger, you know, a party which was always dominant [00:21:00] party, securing at least 20 percent of the share of the vote nationally, if not more suddenly, you know, ending up having a candidate at the president actions getting 6 percent of the share of it. And I think of the following one in two years ago, it got worse because the, the mayor of Paris who was the the Socialist candidate, Annie Delco got not even 2 percent of the share. So for a once dominant party, what a downfall. 

Alan Renwick: It's extraordinary. And many parts of that story feel very familiar to a student of British politics.

So you have the party of the left tracking ever further into the center because funda-, at least partly because that's where the voters are. And yet that strategy leads to a collapse in support for that part for, for, for that party. And I guess in the British case, following on from the Blair- Brown years, um, the Labour Party goes into opposition and the Labour Party then moves itself further to the left, a little bit under [00:22:00] Ed Miliband and then much more decisively under Corbyn.

Um, whereas in France, the Socialist Party just almost kind of disappears from the scene. And I suppose that's partly because of the different electoral system, which means it's easier for parties to the left of the Socialist Party to to form to well, I mean, the, the, the Communist Party, of course, was already there, but other parties to form in that space and take that part of the electorate, while to the right of the Socialist Party, the center ground also is suddenly being taken by another party as well.

So the Socialist Party ends up being squeezed between the, the, the parties further to the left and the centrist bloc. And there's, there's just no space left for it. 

Philippe Marliere: Yes, yes, absolutely. That's absolutely the case. And I think we, we, I owe it at this point to say more about the, the sort of the, they are newcomers.

I said that there was from the 1980s. There was a new comer, you know, on the far right, but I think there's a not another new [00:23:00] comer on the radical left this time around, which is called a France insoumise, which roughly translates into English as Unbowed France laid by former Socialist. He was Senator.

He was a minister under the Josephine government, Jean Luc Mélenchon. And I think what's quite remarkable, and I explain the squeeze you were referring to a while ago, which is that, um, to explain why Socialists are so, so, so weak and so small today, you have to look at where did, where did it lose the voters it had.

I think a chunk of its electorate went to Macron. So it's a kind of a more moderate wing like we have in UK, in UK British party where you have a sort of more moderate wing. Um, and you have also more radical one, the more radical one shifted to to Mélenchon who left the party in 2008. 

And you, you also have another, another [00:24:00] political actor on the left, which is the Greens. The Greens, have been a regular feature in French politics since the 1980s, they have now a significant parliamentary group, about 30 MPs. They run remarkably big cities, you know, a lot of big cities in France like Bordeaux, Strasbourg, are run by green mayors, so that means they have a majority in the town hall.

So this is a fragmented left that you have, and the whole issue now for a Socialist party to regain some power, first of all, on the left and then in general is that, of course, how to regain their electorate. I think they've got to do two things which are very difficult because they're not necessarily, they do not head in the same direction.

One is to regain the lost electorate in Macron. So what, what are those center left voters? I think they tend to be pro European. They are on the left when it comes to the [00:25:00] economy, but, not radical left, you know, it has to be a kind of a kind of left wing agenda, but it's fairly moderate.

Nonetheless, when it comes to socioeconomic reforms. They are on the left. They're just not and they don't claim to be anti capitalist, for instance. 

Alan Renwick: So there are still voters in the social democratic space, in the centre left space.

It's the party that has collapsed rather than the 

Philippe Marliere: Yes, I think those voters are still there. And I think you just have to sort of regain, you have to sort of recover that lost electorate. And I think that's the whole problem. And some of them went, got radicalised, and went to Mélenchon or the Greens. And that's the difficulty.

So, at the moment the Socialists are part of an intellectual alliance called the New Popular Front, which is an interesting name because Popular Front was the name given to the first coalition, Socialist Communist Radical in the 1930s. Which led to this first left wing government new popular [00:26:00] front. I would call it an actual coalition It's not an umbrella organization.

It's not certainly not a party still so many disagreements and maybe hostility between those parties disagree on a number of things, but at least they understood that with that making that coalition they would run the risk of a real of a wipeout in a general election.

So that means an actual coalition, instead of fielding a Socialist, communist, and Unbowed France and green, um, candidate in a constituency, you only have one candidate. So of course you maximize the chances of that candidate to win the vote. So France is a, is a majoritarian system with two ballots. If you don't secure 50 percent of the vote in the first round, there's a rerun.

So that's why they manage, to come out on top of the recent general election. 

Alan Renwick: So the left, the left alliance as a whole came out on top? Yes, on top. What was the position of the Socialist party [00:27:00] within that? How strong was the Socialist party in that alliance? 

Philippe Marliere: Well, it did well. And I think that's very interesting because I think it made the choice of a left wing alliance. Yeah. Could have gone it alone and decided, well, we're going to step out of this coalition, because in that coalition, you have a Unbowed France led by Mélenchon, who is a kind of radical left populist, and who is quite disliked, and untrusted by a number of Socialist voters and very much disliked by the rest of the electorate.

So they could have opted out, but they didn't. Why they didn't, and I think they made the right choice, it was the right call, because had they done that, they would have shifted further to the kind of centre left or centre, where there is actually no space in French politics, because look what happened to Macron a few years down the line is now seen by every political and analyst in France as a center left, if not right wing in France.

He's not, he's not a centrist. [00:28:00] France is an interesting case for people who wonder whether the actual center in politics exists. No, you either lean to the left or the right. And even center right now is, is, is is quite implausible. 

So, they made that choice, which I think proved to be good, because from 33 MPs, which they had in the previous chamber, they went up to 66, so double.

And they're now almost on a par with Unbowed France. So that means, by telling or showing the electorate that they are a popular party on the left, they regain the confidence of their electorate. The trouble is is that life in that correlation with Mélenchon is proving hard. Mélenchon is a very difficult customer and they've got really to to make sure that they stay on the left, but they don't drift too, too, too much to the left, because otherwise they will run the risk again of losing that electorate, which is more moderate.

Alan Renwick: But does Macron's drift to the right [00:29:00] open up space for them again that for a period doesn't, didn't exist? I mean, is, is there now a kind of a clear kind of public demand for a clear center left party that perhaps previously was being satisfied to some degree by on its left fringe Mélenchon on, on its right fringe Macron and now there's clearer space there for the Socialist party to occupy?

Philippe Marliere: I would think so. I would think so that in a, in the long run the best position for the Socialist parties to stay where they are. So, you know, part of the coalition of the left, the total left wing vote in France is at a historic low, 30 percent altogether. So it means that all the rest, 70%, I'm talking about people who vote, not people who abstain, but people who vote, 70 percent is either center right, right wing, or far right.

And now it's 30, 35 percent of it being on the far right. So that shows an anomaly. That left block came out on top of that election [00:30:00] due to tactical voting, but they are in a chamber where they're in a minority. So still, it's good to stay on the left because where would they go if opt out of that, of that coalition.

I think the electorate would probably sanction them again, like they did in 2017. So better to stay put. 

Alan Renwick: Wrapping that up very finally, we must finish, but is it fair to say then that the structural conditions are kind of there for a resurgence of the Socialist Party in France, but party fortunes depend not just on structural conditions, they also depend on individuals, on leaders, as you say, and you talked about Mitterrand's central role in the success of the Socialist Party in the 1980s.

And those more personal factors are just not present yet. And so it's further change is going to need to come along over the next few years if the Socialist Party is really going to revive. 

Philippe Marliere: I agree. I think the, the French case is really showing so dramatically that personal factors are so key in politics.

I think we've had also long, [00:31:00] lots of debates in the, in the Labour Party when Jeremy Corbyn was the leader. Personal factors. You may. Put forward the most amazingly left wing policy platform. If people do not trust you as a leader, you're not going to make it.

You also need to be media savvy. And all that is lacking in, in the Socialist party. You know, it's a party who had you know, lots of superstardom and plenty of wealth of it for a very long time. All those guys are now retired from politics or have died. And it's a new generation, but that new generation is a generation of the car crash, you know, which 2017, there are new officials, new people elected.

They're very young in their 2030s, but they have, so far, they, they're not, you know, public figures. So that, that is, that is absolutely missing. And also you need a narrative and that seems to be missing.

It's not simply a catalogue of policies which will sort of [00:32:00] attract voters. Macron had one, probably lost the momentum. Unfortunately, the only party or bloc which has an attractive narrative, and I don't think it's a good one, it is proving an attractive narrative for some voters, is the national rally.

Alan Renwick: Yeah, I said that was my last question. I can't resist another one, and it was going to be on exactly that. The so many people in this country and around the world are concerned about what will happen in the next presidential election, which is due in 2027, if I remember correctly. And Macron, his popularity seems to have fallen so far.

I mean, I think he can't run again anyway, but it's not clear that someone from his bloc would be able to carry that flag. The concern, therefore, is that the far right, would be able to win the presidential election for the first time. I mean, is it more likely that the, the, the strongest candidate to defeat the far right would come again somehow from the Macron bloc from the center?

Or is there potential for someone on the center left to [00:33:00] fill that space? 

Philippe Marliere: Yes, it's hard to tell. So as one says, you know, a week in politics is a long time. So imagine until 2027. We don't know what might happen. I would suspect to start with that the current government and chamber will not last until 2027.

We will have another snap election, maybe in a year time, as early as that, because the current government is minority government, and he only, he only survives, if you like, and can go on as long as the national rally decides not to vote, a motion of no confidence. So that's a very bad situation to be in. So there might be a general election before the presidential one, but you're right. The presidential election will be in 2027. That's the key election in French politics.

But imagine there's a general election before, then the far right might win it this time. Why? Because it was defeated only due to tactical voting, i. e. left wing voters voting for Macron or [00:34:00] conservative candidates when they were better placed in the constituency and vice versa. But when you look at the total votes, the far right won that election.

Largely. So it's really tactical voting on a massive scale, which prevented that. This time around, maybe they won't be tactical voting, because some voters, enough of them might be feeling totally disenfranchised and disillusioned by what just happened. Macron, instead of turning to the left, and say, try to form a government, he decided against that and turned to the right.

So lots of people on the left, lots of voters are very angry about the whole situation. 

Alan Renwick: Well, thank you so much, Philippe. I've learned a huge amount there. I could go on asking questions and discussing this with you for such a long time, because there's so much more to explore, but we've covered a huge amount of ground in not very much time there.

And that's been really great. So many, many thanks. We have been discussing Philippe Marliere article, French Social Democracy in Turmoil, which was published on the Political [00:35:00] Quarterly website over the summer. You'll find a link in the show note. You'll find a link in the show notes for this episode. And while you're there, be sure to check other recent PQ articles on the UK Labour Party's economic strategy, the role of celebrities in politics and much else.

Next week here on UCL Uncovering Politics, I'm not completely sure, but I think we are going to be looking at the idea of mission driven bureaucrats, so do look out for that. Remember to make sure you don't miss out on that or other future episodes of UCL Uncovering Politics. All you need to do is subscribe.

You can do so on Apple, Google Podcasts or whatever podcast provider you use. And while you're there, we'd love it if you could take a moment to like this video and leave a comment, and we'd love it if you could also review us. I'm Alan Renwick. This episode was produced by Kaiser Kang and Eleanor Kingwell Banham.

Our theme music is written and performed by John Mann. This has been UCL Uncovering Politics. Thank you for listening. [00:36:00]