This week we’re looking at the elections in the United States. Donald Trump has won; the Democrats have been comprehensively defeated. What explains the result? And what are the implications – for the US and the wider world?
One week after the US elections, Donald Trump has claimed victory, securing the presidency, the Senate, and almost certainly – though not yet confirmed – the House of Representatives as well. This sweeping win over Kamala Harris and the Democratic Party has ignited widespread discussion: what went wrong for the Democrats, and what lies ahead for both parties?
In this episode, we examine these key questions with our expert guests, exploring what this election outcome could mean for US policy on critical issues, including climate change, trade, democracy, and America’s relations with Ukraine, the Middle East, and China. With so much at stake, there’s already intense debate about the direction the country – and indeed, the world – may take in the coming years.
To shed light on these issues we are joined by:
Both Dr Gift and Dr Norman bring deep expertise in US politics and policy, offering insights into where things stand, what to expect from the new administration, and the potential global implications. Together, they help to unpack the complexities of these developments and consider what the future might hold.
Alan Renwick: [00:00:00] Hello, this is UCL Uncovering Politics. And this week we're looking at the elections in the United States. Donald Trump has won. The Democrats have been comprehensively defeated. So what explains the result and what are the implications for the U S and the wider world?
Hello, my name is Alan Renwick and welcome to UCL Uncovering Politics, the podcast of the School of Public Policy and Department of Political Science at University College London. We're now a week on from the elections in the United States. Donald Trump has won the presidency, the Senate, and almost certainly, though, as we record this, not yet quite definitely the House of Representatives.
With such a clean sweep against Kamala Harris and the Democratic Party, there has been much discussion and debate around what happened and what the future holds for both parties. And of course, there are big questions about future policy directions and their implications around the world on climate, tariffs, [00:01:00] democracy, Ukraine, the Middle East, China, and much else.
Well, to make sense of where these debates have got to, I'm delighted to be joined today by two of my colleagues with great expertise on U. S. politics and policy. Dr. Thomas Gift is Associate Professor in Political Science and Dr. Julie Norman is Associate Professor in Politics and International Relations, both here in the UCL Department of Political Science.
Thomas is also Director of CUSP, the UCL Centre on US Politics, while Julie is its Foreign Policy Lead. Thomas and Julie, welcome back to the podcast. It's great to have you on again. And let's begin by looking at where we've got to in the debate around explanations for the election outcome. A week on from the vote.
What do we know? What do we not know? Where is our sense of things going? Thomas, do you want to start off?
Thomas Gift: Well, the first thing that I would say is that this was really a resounding victory for Donald Trump and the [00:02:00] Republicans. Donald Trump took every single swing state and improved his margins from 2020 in nearly every county across the country, which is really quite remarkable.
And not only that, we also saw a lot of success down ballot for Republicans taking control of the Senate, and it looks like it's going to have the house, um, as well. So it's hard to write a better script, I think if you were, uh, Donald Trump and his supporters. Thinking about why this happened, I think one of the big issues is simply that there is an anti incumbent sentiment, and I don't think that that's unique to the United States.
We also saw that here in the UK, but that was a big headwind against the Democrats. Another issue was the economy, inflation, despite the fact that it has cooled considerably in the last several months. Still, if you look at prices compared to pre pandemic, they're up about 20 to 30 percent, particularly when it comes to food and groceries.
And I also think that, uh, Kamala [00:03:00] Harris simply didn't run as effective of a campaign as she could have. We can get into that more later.
Alan Renwick: Well, I'm intrigued. What do you mean by that?
Thomas Gift: Well, I think that she really tried to make this election a referendum on democracy. She said that democracy was at stake.
And if you look at the data, it seems like a majority of Americans did think that democracy was at risk in this election. But if you look at how many of them prioritize it as the number one issue, it was only about two to three percent. And so she kind of banked her entire campaign on the fact that, you know, Donald Trump was going to threaten the very existence of the Republic.
And I think that by and large, voters just didn't have it.
Alan Renwick: Julie, do you agree with that?
Julie Norman: Yeah, I agree with a lot of it. And I think for people listening to the show with a political science interest or background, too, you know, I think the results can be analyzed from a lot of different levels.
These global trends that Thomas talked about that not only here in the UK, but really around the world, we've seen most governments flip or incumbents kind of [00:04:00] take a hit. Nationally, you know, Biden had his own flaws, stayed in the race for a long time. Many Democrats feel if he had that he himself was just an unpopular incumbent that Harris could not really unlink herself from and make a strong case that she would be, you know, a case for change. You can look at the campaigns and what they chose to do or not and just the individuals and you know some of the sociology behind how people were attracted or unattracted to one candidate or the other. So I think there's lots of layers here and there's no right or wrong answer.
I think just a lot of different layers. I will say to the campaign to pick up where Thomas left off, you know, Harris did zeer in on democracy as one of her main Issues, which I think was sort of over learning the lessons from the 2022 midterms, where the Democrats overperformed in that election, very much on that democracy message, but people who come out for midterms are sometimes different than than the masses that come out for the presidential election.
The other thing she really put all her focus on was was [00:05:00] abortion and really trying to get this women's vote out around this issue. Again, that worked in the midterms in 2022 for Democrats, but I think was just not as salient for voters as as Thomas mentioned the economy more kitchen table issues that resonated a bit more broadly.
So I think just some of these issues that they thought would be their linchpins just were not what voters were fully focused on.
Alan Renwick: And you mentioned their Biden's flaws. And for many of our listeners. Trump had extraordinary flaws as well and unique flaws in this election. Were they not also important?
Julie Norman: Well, absolutely. And I think that there were many who voted for Trump who were representative of the MAGA base who really were attracted to his charisma to this kind of anti elite, um, sentiment that he brings in this sense of kind of standing up to the establishment, standing up to the elite, seeing everyday people.
But there were a lot of people who voted for Trump that weren't super enamored by him, but [00:06:00] just felt that he was the better candidate for the economy. He was the better candidate for change and we're just turned off from the Democrats for for whatever reason. I would agree with that. I mean, Donald Trump is a uniquely iconoclastic and charismatic figure.
Uh, and he's known as the Teflon president because nothing sticks to him. And so scandal after scandal, allegation after allegation, He's really not hurt in the way that I think other politicians would be. We just heard so many times, one after the next, after the next, after the next, that Donald Trump was meeting his political demise, whether that was his first impeachment, whether that was his second impeachment, whether that was January 6, whether that was the 2022 midterms when Trump backed candidates did very, very poorly. Donald Trump. just exceeded expectations. And there's a certain core of supporters, I would say about 30 to 40 percent of the American electorate that are just not bothered by this
Alan Renwick: 30 to 40 percent of the electorate. I mean, that that's a big part of the electorate.
Thomas Gift: It's a very big [00:07:00] part of the electorate and even a larger share, of course, of the Republican Party.
Alan Renwick: Yeah, yeah. So where do the Democrats go from here? How do the Democrats rebuild after such a big defeat?
Thomas Gift: Well, it's certainly a challenge, um, and they're going to have to start from the ground up and there's certainly going to be a post mortem, as there always is, uh, when a party gets trounced in an election, uh, like this one.
As I said, I do think that Democrats need to rethink their messaging on democracy. It was just not an issue that resonated with voters very much. I also think that Democrats have just shifted too far to the left on too many social and cultural issues. I think that that is not necessarily reflective of Kamala Harris's positions or even Joe Biden's, but the party as a whole, whether that's, um, issues of transgenderism, uh, whether that's issues of diversity, equity, inclusion, uh, whether that's even related to kind of positions on immigration.
I, [00:08:00] I think some of these issues really, um, alienated, um, a sizable fraction of moderate voters in, in America.
Julie Norman: Well, I would say this is going to be a big debater out for Democrats, and it always is for Democrats when they lose, because they are this big tent party where they are trying to court moderates and centrists, On the one hand, you know, Kamala campaigned with, uh, noted Republican Liz Cheney in a number of states, et cetera.
But then they're also trying to get out the vote among progressives, among their more reliable base. And so, often when they lose, there's this finger pointing by the left side of the party saying, you went too far to the center and were too worried about courting the moderates. And the centrist and more moderate side saying, you, what Thomas just said, you were, you know, too progressive in some of these policies that the party has really stood for the last several years.
And I think Harris got herself in a bit of a bind because she was sort of trying to be all things to all people. And that can, you know, appeal to all people, [00:09:00] but people also can read the opposite of what you are trying to say also. So centrists see her as being too progressive, progressives see her as being too centrist, and so I think that approach backfired on her.
But it's, it's always an identity issue for the party, and they always struggle with this.
Thomas Gift: If I could just add, um, also, I think Democrats have really lost the working class. We saw Bernie Sanders come out just in the last few days to say that Democrats didn't spend enough time talking to normal, everyday Americans.
There really has been a large scale realignment in the electorate where Republicans are now the party of blue collar workers, and they have also added significant shares at the same time of minority voters. I think there was this sense that among Democrats, demography is destiny and as the country became more diverse, that these would naturally be coalitions that would support the Democratic Party, but it turns out that that's not necessarily true and I think Donald Trump was very effective at tapping into that.
Alan Renwick: And one of the striking things, if you look at [00:10:00] the election results, if you just look at the aggregate vote figures, then Trump's vote total is pretty much the same as it was four years ago. Whereas, uh, Harris vote total is way down on Biden's from last time. And at least one interpretation that I've seen put on that is that basically a lot of the, uh, progressive voters who have been put off on issues such as the Israel- Gaza conflict and, you know, some, some other issues that they really care about just chose not to turn out for hours this time and that, therefore, on that interpretation, it's actually kind of shoring up that vote that is really needed.
Julie Norman: Yeah, I mean, I think this is an important point to make, but I would say they, you know, They lost votes in a couple different demographics that often get lumped together, which is progressives and minority voters, and they did lose. Progressive, they lot, a lot, a lot of young, um, younger persons votes, especially in college towns, places that are, you know, usually much stronger for Democrats.
Um, and they also lost in the city. So in Pennsylvania, in Michigan, in the swing states, it wasn't always losing in the [00:11:00] rural counties, it was that they didn't get the vote out enough in Philadelphia, in Detroit, and a lot of those voters, some are progressive, but some are, yes, minority voters, but often with more moderate conservative positions.
And so I think the party has often conflated those groups, um, in ways that are maybe not as accurate. And, uh, as Thomas said, working class message is something that maybe has kind of fallen by the wayside.
Thomas Gift: Yeah, it really reflects the fact that these elections now are really about mobilizing the bases and it's about sort of the ground game.
And I do think that there was a enthusiasm gap between what should be or the core supporters of Kamala Harris versus those of Donald Trump. I really think that we're in this era, kind of a post persuasion politics, where neither party is making an effort to reach out and court the center. Instead, it's all about ensuring the bases turn out to vote.
Alan Renwick: But in a sense, the working class electorate is now the mobile bit of the electorate, the bit of the electorate that could potentially [00:12:00] move between parties, isn't it? I mean, I guess I'm looking at this from my sort of British politics angle and thinking that what you're saying sounds very similar to the Labour Party's diagnosis after 2019 of what they had got wrong and what they needed to change in order to win again.
And so their strategy was very much around winning back working class and sort of aspirational middle class of voters who had traditionally voted for the Labour Party, but switched over to Boris Johnson's Conservative Party because they just felt that Labour was no longer speaking to ordinary folk like them.
Um, but that is now the bit of the electorate that is capable of moving between the Labour and Conservative Parties in the UK, and I guess also I'm just totally misinterpreting what happens across the pond. The Democrat and Republican parties in the U. S. as well.
Julie Norman: Yeah, I think it largely is. I mean, and everything we've been saying has has touched on that and I think in 2020, that was certainly the instinct for Joe Biden trying to be you know, Union [00:13:00] Joe, Scranton Joe and trying to mobilize those bases. And to some degree that that worked. Um, but I would say, as Thomas started out our conversation, noting your hair is lost across almost all demographics.
So, you know, in suburbs and more affluent cities. So, yes, the working class is that swing demographic, but other demographics also the suburbs, you know, women, these, these other demographics that they thought would come out for Democrats were also lagging behind. The one, the other thing I'll just note, too, is we should just remember to 2020 was a different election in the sense that it was covered.
There was a lot more mail and ballot. There was a lot more voting turnout logistically in that one, too. So, I think that should be a little note when we look at the numbers.
Alan Renwick: And what about the Republican Party, Thomas? Where is it? Is it now the pure Trump party, the pure MAGA party? Is the old Republican Party dead?
Thomas Gift: I think it is. I think Donald Trump has completely, uh, dominated, uh, this party. And it really is the MAGA party. This is [00:14:00] sort of the MAGAverse. I mean, Donald Trump, uh, He, uh, exerted a tremendous amount of influence on Republicans on Capitol Hill during his first administration. Even when he was out of office, most Republicans were hesitant to challenge him or critique him.
We saw in the primaries, Donald Trump cleaned up. It wasn't even close. I mean, if you think about some other candidates who, you know, on the face of it might have had a chance. Nikki Haley, uh, Ron DeSantis, uh, and others. It really wasn't much of a contest. Trump took Iowa, he took New Hampshire, and then the rest of it was over.
So this is the party of Trump, and I think that these kind of so called moderate, uh, Republicans are more or less an endangered species now.
Julie Norman: Yeah, and I would just say, you know, we're seeing that not just at the executive level, but also in Congress and the congressional leadership that's taking shape as well.
So in the Senate, we have an outgoing Republican leader, Senator Mitch McConnell, who was sort of a stalwart of the older traditional [00:15:00] Republican brand who looks like he'll most likely replaced by Senator Rick Scott, who's much more in the, um, the Trump more MAGA, um, uh, leading side of the party. So even the institutions that are.
Not the president. I think we'll see much more of a bent towards a MAGA sort of a ethos and approach to things.
Alan Renwick: And I guess this has implications for what now happens now that now that Trump is entering power and what the policy directions are going to be for this administration. And maybe we should start Julie on a foreign policy implications, which will obviously be of direct relevance to many of our listeners.
Um, we've heard a lot about, Trump's approach to Ukraine and NATO and suggestions that he wants to do a quick deal and, uh, and get out, essentially. What should we expect to happen?
Julie Norman: Yeah, I mean, one thing I would just remind listeners is that Trump is unpredictable. So some things that he says or that we, you know, think he might do often that changes [00:16:00] pretty quickly.
But on Ukraine, we do expect that he will want to a) wind down U. S. support for the war, which has been largely military aid, um, and try and get to some kind of deal between the parties. Now, notably in his first call with Putin, he did apparently tell Putin, don't escalate this war further, kind of this idea of we are trying to get it to wind down, but it's more the deal that I think Trump is, um, willing to push the parties towards, one that I think Europe certainly would see as very much in Putin's favor, a land for peace sort of arrangement where, uh, Ukraine would essentially, you know, cede Crimea, cede the Donbass in exchange for peace and probably, um, halt any pathway to NATO accession or NATO membership as well.
So my guess is that's what we're looking at in terms of what Trump envisions as a negotiated settlement. Um, and we'll see how that actually, uh, plays out and if he can, you know, if he can convince the parties to, to move in that way or not and what that means for Europe.
Alan Renwick: So by the parties, you mean the parties in the United States?
Julie Norman: [00:17:00] I meant Ukraine and Russia. If, um, you know, if, if Zelensky would even entertain the idea of negotiating on these terms, even if Putin would be open to negotiations at this point. Um, so I think, you know, it'll, it'll, Trump will have obviously leveraged on both of them, um, but at the end of the day the deal will ultimately be between the parties in the war.
Alan Renwick: So, okay. And so within the United States, we're presuming that Trump gets his way. There's, there's no.
Julie Norman: I think the fact that Trump will likely have control over both houses of Congress, it's unlikely that any further military aid from the U S will be forthcoming for Ukraine in any kind of meaningful way.
Um, and that will be the, the pressure of the leverage that the U. S. has over Ukraine to push towards negotiations.
Alan Renwick: Now, you're an expert, Julie, not just on the United States, but also particularly on the Middle East. What can we expect from a Trump presidency ?
Julie Norman: Yes. So again, I mean, Trump doesn't like a lot of Uh, international wars entanglements that the U. S. might get drawn into. So I do think he's going to want to [00:18:00] say the Gaza war, the Lebanon war to wind down. But again, it's the terms on which he is willing to have those wars wind down that will look a lot different from even the Biden administration.
It's likely that Trump would be absolutely fine with Israel maintaining either a military occupation or even settlements in Gaza. And I think even more, um, uh, you know, probably with more impact is, um, the West Bank. So we even just heard yesterday from, um, Israel's finance minister saying Trump is in office now we can go ahead and start annexing parts of the West Bank like we've been essentially waiting to do. Um, that's something that was, um, sort of on the table at the end of Trump's first term, and something that I would imagine him, um, kind of giving carte blanche for Israel to do at this point. So, all those moves would kind of push a two state solution much further away.
Um, I think Trump will also be much tougher on Iran. Um, though again, that, even that relationship kind of remains to be seen, but I think we can see a return to maximum pressure, um, and support for [00:19:00] Israel to, um, you know, take whatever actions they deem necessary in terms of Iran.
Alan Renwick: How will these kinds of policies go down with the United States allies around the world?
I mean, you know, so many countries have been trying to achieve this very delicate balance in the Middle East between supporting Israel, but on the other hand not allowing Israel to do just whatever it wants to the people of Gaza and Palestine more broadly. And I mean, it sounds, kind of sounds like you're suggesting that with Trump, Israel can just kind of go ahead and do what it wants.
And that's going to be really difficult for many governments to accept.
Julie Norman: It may be, but I would say that, you know, the U. S. has policies in the region have been unpopular with many other countries up till now as well. They were unpopular before under Trump. And again, a candidate or a president who sees things through a more unilateral lens through a more America first lens.
Um, the idea of maybe upsetting allies is probably not going to be his number one concern for the decisions that he makes and where he sees [00:20:00] U. S. most interests, U. S. Interests aligning most with, say, Israel's or other allies in the region
Alan Renwick: And given your expertise on the Middle East. What, what are the implications of the implementation of such a policy agenda on the ground?
Julie Norman: Yeah, I mean, one thing I do want to qualify is that I don't see Trump trying to implement his own policies, so much as giving a green light to the right wing governments and Israel to move forward with policies they've been kind of having ready for a while. Um, and as I suggested, this would likely make, um, any kind of two state solution, any kind of Palestinian self determination, any kind of meaningful way, um, that would push that much further down the road and, and perhaps even make it, um, you know, close to impossible if some of these moves go forward.
Alan Renwick: And doesn't that just mean the continuation of strife? I mean, I mean, maybe my view of this is too simplistic, but I can't see how anything but a two state [00:21:00] solution could deliver peace in that part of the world. And if we're moving further away from it, then that sounds like bad news.
Julie Norman: It certainly does.
I mean, for people like myself who work in the region, there's a sense that You know, as long as the occupation is ongoing, as long as any kind of meaningful movements towards a peace process are continually postponed or made impossible, that's just going to mobilize resistance kind of indefinitely, no matter how many times you hit Hamas, you hit Hezbollah, other groups will emerge in their wake, as long as there's still this grievance and this sense of, um, the sense of either occupation or complete takeover. I will say, you know, Trump is also very savvy about working with Arab states, though in the region he's likely to wanna get Saudi Arabia in on a deal. Um, and, and I think if he feels he has the cover of Arab states, then um, that's something that, that I think he believes will, um, you maybe ameliorate some of these moves, but it's, it's unclear if, if those states would go along with things that are [00:22:00] more far reaching.
Alan Renwick: Yeah. China, I guess, is the third big foreign policy area that we ought also to talk about. Julie, do you want to,
Julie Norman: Yeah, I mean, yeah, I can, I can maybe toss this one over to Thomas too. I mean, the main policy that Trump has articulated regarding China is in regards to tariffs. So, um, as many European listeners might be aware, Trump has talked big about tariffs across the board, 10 to 20 percent for all countries, but up to 60 percent for China. So definitely re reigniting or kind of giving another boost to that trade war that has has been ongoing. Um, and I think other policies around China are yet are kind of yet to be seen with how he would approach beyond that. But the tariffs pieces, I think, is something he can and will do relatively quickly, maybe not to that level.
But tariffs are something the president can can do pretty easily.
Thomas Gift: The president can take those actions unilaterally. And we saw In Trump's first administration, that he was not shy about imposing tariffs on China, that it was very turbulent, very [00:23:00] volatile, and very unpredictable. Upwards of 60 percent tariffs on imports from China is hugely significant.
It would, exacerbate inflation in the United States because these costs are eventually passed on to consumers. But I don't think this is just cheap talk from Trump. Some of the things he talked about in the election, of course, he just said to get elected. But this is one area where he's been very ideologically consistent.
Dating back 1980s, 1990s when he was talking about China eating America's lunch and not playing by the rules.
Alan Renwick: I find this really intriguing because, you know, so many people are talking about the big lesson from this election is that voters hate inflation. And, and yet he seems to be proposing a very inflationary policy. You know, as you say, these, these, um, tariffs would have a huge impact on the prices paid by American voters in the shops if they were implemented. But nevertheless, you think that he's, he's willing to push it through.
I
Thomas Gift: absolutely think that he's willing to push it through, and you're right, there is [00:24:00] certainly an irony there, uh, that Americans want inflation and prices to be curbed, and yet, much of Donald Trump's agenda is inflationary.
He's proposing high spending. The current federal debt is about 35 trillion. Most estimates show that his budget, if it were all passed, would increase that by about 7. 5 trillion during the course of his presidency. He's talked about mass deportation of immigrants, which of course would constrict the labor supply, increase prices even further, and then the tariffs.
The tariffs are really the big issue. I mean, most data suggests that for typical middle income family, over the course of the year, their bundle of goods that they would purchase would go up about four to five thousand U. S. dollars.
Alan Renwick: Wow, and is that that across all the tariffs that he's talked about so he we've talked mainly about the China ones there so far But he's also proposed tariffs on imports across the whole world of lower levels that are 10 to 20 percent.
Thomas Gift: Absolutely. Yeah 10 to 20 percent whether that's [00:25:00] Canada or Mexico or the UK for that matter.
Alan Renwick: And you think he'll do that? Because I mean, I've, I've heard lots of people thinking yeah, actually he's not going to do that, but you, you think he's, he's on this one?
Thomas Gift: I'm less convinced that they will reach levels of 10 to 20 percent.
Uh, might be smaller. At the same time, there are all sorts of, uh, exemptions that Trump has given to companies, firms, sectors in the past that are favorable to him. I wouldn't be surprised if there are a lot of, uh, loopholes if he did impose this policy.
Alan Renwick: And you mentioned the deportation policy as well.
Thomas Gift: Well, Donald Trump certainly made, in addition to the economy, immigration one of his marquee policy platforms. And we remember during his first administration, he wanted to build the the U. S. Mexico border wall, and he promised that Mexico would pay for it. Well, Mexico never paid for it. Only about two percent of the wall ever got built, but he's re upping this as a marquee agenda item, in addition to the fact that he wants to impose these massive [00:26:00] deportations of immigrants while also, um, strengthening of the border.
I think that these proposals to import millions and millions of undocumented immigrants is unrealistic and it won't happen. Immigration is really one issue where both the Democrats and the Republicans want the issue more than they actually want to solve the problem because they feel that it it speaks to sort of core concerns within each of their respective bases.
So, do I expect that there to be more, uh, emphasis on immigration and border policy? Yes. Um, but will Donald Trump's, um, more ambitious goals be realized? I'm doubtful of that.
Alan Renwick: Many of our listeners will have heard of Project 2025 and a lot of people talking about this. And do you want to explain just quickly what that actually is and how likely is it that that kind of policy agenda is going to be?
Thomas Gift: So Project 2025 is a pamphlet, almost a blueprint for
Alan Renwick: a big 900 [00:27:00] page pamphlet.
Thomas Gift: So we could call this a tome, I guess would be more appropriate. That was produced by a number of Trump associates and former associates and published by the Heritage Foundation, which is a conservative think tank. in Washington, D. C. And on all manner of different policies, whether that's abortion or immigration or the economy, it charts out a very right wing vision for how the governing majority should pursue their goals. I do think, Alan, that this is one critique of Donald Trump that was unfair to him, simply because he really did not have uh, anything to do with the, uh, with Project 2025 itself, he on multiple occasions, um, disavowed it. Are there elements of Project 2025 that he will pursue? Yes, um, but those are largely, well, uh, like, like tax cuts, um, [00:28:00] like deregulation and so on. But those are largely kind of standard Republican orthodoxy. So I think Democrats had a lot to critique Donald Trump on. I don't think that they needed to invent things to criticize him. And, you know, but they did think that this had quite a lot of potential. Would allow them to get quite a lot of political distance.
Julie Norman: I was at one one elements in 2020 project 2025 that I do think has some concerns regarding Trump is, um, it is a bit of a blueprint for not exactly draining the swamp of big government, but more. Um, moving some of the control on government into the executive, um, and it kind of within the direct control of the president. So kind of gutting some of the departments, but putting a bit more under the direct line of the presidency. And so, I wouldn't exp I I wouldn't be surprised if we see that happening under Trump, given, you know, the indications that he's, you know, he's made, um, you know, moves to close some of the departments, um, kind of moves to re, to rejiggle things a little bit in his interest. So I do think that part matters.
Alan Renwick: And we haven't mentioned climate policy. We're speaking in the middle of a [00:29:00] COP.
Julie Norman: Yeah, I mean, climate is an issue that obviously bridges both the domestic and the international. And I think domestically, we'll certainly see an unwinding of Different regulations that the Biden administration has put in place, certainly a weakening of institutions like the EPA, the Environmental Protection Agency, you know, probably some de-investment, so to speak, and in some of the green energy that's been building over the last few years.
Globally, that will obviously have ramifications as well. I wouldn't be surprised if Trump withdraws from the Paris Accords once again, which he did in his first term, um, you know, different kinds of pressures on allies and support for companies and corporations that prefer, say, fossil fuels to more renewables or green energy.
So I, I do think this is going to have an impact on climate policy, um, and in both international and the domestic sphere.
Alan Renwick: And how much can Trump actually do in this sphere? Because quite a lot is done by the states and more local levels of government in this area, isn't it?
Julie Norman: A fair amount is, but, um, in his first term, I know [00:30:00] he undid, uh, over a hundred different environmental regulations that had passed more at the, uh, at the national level.
Um, a lot of Biden's key legislation had to do with, um, green energy investments and and again, some of that's just good for business now that I think Trump might be convinced by some of the business community to leave some of those things in place. But in terms of regulations and where, um, where business would like to see some of those undone, there a lot can still be done at the national level around that.
Alan Renwick: Final question to both of you. Many of our listeners will be concerned about the future of democracy in the United States. Should they, should they be?
Thomas Gift: Well, I still think that American democracy is resilient, and we did see that in 2021 amid Donald Trump's contestation of the electoral results by and large institutions held January 6 rioters. Many of them are in prison now, Donald Trump's baseless claims of election [00:31:00] rigging mostly winded their way through the states, uh, and through the courts where most were summarily and correctly dismissed. Does Donald Trump represent a threat to kind of democratic culture and norms?
Yes, but I think that that's different than saying that the United States faces an existential threat.
Julie Norman: Yeah, I would mostly agree. Some of my students may have heard me talk about the difference between, say, procedural democracies and substantive democracies. And I do think there was a concern in the U. S. going into this election that even the procedural side might be at risk if we had yet another massive contested election with people doubting just the integrity of the U. S. Electoral system. Um, the fact that this election was fast, clean that we're not having these weeks and months of litigation and contestation, I do think probably helps just the electoral system in the U. S. Um, stabilize a bit and the trust in it stabilize a bit. Um, the substantive, I think, is still yet to be seen, and I think it [00:32:00] depends how much Trump wins. Actually leans and it leans into and implement some of these more authoritarian impulses that we've seen him, um, kind of gesture at and hint at and sometimes even speak directly to. And if there's come to pass that that that will be a shift for, um, as Trump, as a as Thomas said, for kind of the democratic norms and the in the U. S. and I think that does reverberate in nationally as well.
Alan Renwick: And can supporters of democracy in the United States do anything in the coming years in order to reinforce those norms?
Julie Norman: Oh, absolutely. And I would say I think this goes across both parties. And one thing I would even point out it for the 2020 election is that many of Trump supporters you felt they were defending democracy. Like if you talk to people who are active in the MAGA movement and that is how they see it. So I do think that at the more grassroots levels, Americans are still very committed to democracy, whatever side of the aisle they're on or whoever they voted for. Um, and I think this will [00:33:00] be a time to kind of, you know, recenter how people engage in, politics and in quote unquote democracy, whether that's through more, um, you know, community things through schools through things that are just a bit more locally based as well as through trying to make sure that their voices and opinions are represented nationally.
Alan Renwick: Well, we finish on a note of some optimism, at least. So thank you so much, Thomas and Julie. We've, we've covered a huge amount of ground there, but, uh, so interesting to hear your expert perspectives on all of these different issues. We've been discussing the U. S. Election and its domestic and international policy implications with Thomas Gift and Julie Norman.
Next week here on UCL Uncovering Politics, we'll be looking at fact checking and free speech. Some social media companies fact check posts and tag those deemed to contain misinformation. But reflecting free speech concerns, they typically exempt posts from politicians. We'll be looking at the rights and wrongs of such policies.[00:34:00]
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I'm Alan Renwick. This episode was produced by Kaiser Kang and Eleanor Kingwell Banham. Our theme music is written and performed by John Mann. This has been UCL Uncovering Politics. Thank you for listening.